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Stealth Indoctrination: Forced Speech in
the Classroom *
Martin Guggenheimt
In the 2003 Term, the Supreme Court of the United States
agreed to consider whether the Constitution permits the recita-
tion of the Pledge of Allegiance in the public schools.' One would
have thought this question was resolved long ago. Twice before,
in 1940 and then in 1943, the Court took up related questions.
This Article takes the renewed interest in the constitutional-
ity of the Pledge as an opportunity to reexamine the role of pub-
lic schools in instilling civic values and principles in children.
Part I discusses the Supreme Court's prior jurisprudence with
respect to the Pledge, and Part II reviews the particular case
that has brought the Pledge back before the Court. Part III dis-
cusses the questions to which the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and separates out the particular question of whether using
the Pledge in a school setting is constitutional.
Turning to the Pledge's effects on children, Part IV con-
cludes that the lower court likely overstated the singular effects
of the inclusion in the Pledge of the words "under God." Part V
discusses the remaining, and more general, implications of the
pressures on schoolchildren to recite the Pledge, particularly in
light of the apparent fact that few students who recite the Pledge
know that they are under no obligation to do so. Part VI consid-
ers recent cases that have required the Supreme Court to strike
a balance between the interests of children and the interests of
schools. Because the Court has shifted this balance away from
* Editor's Note:
This article was originally presented in October 2003 and was completed before the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 US __, 124 S Ct
2301 (2004). In the article, Professor Guggenheim predicted that the Court might well rule that the
plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the use of the Pledge of Allegiance in
public schools. This was the Court's ruling. The focus of the article, however, is on the merits of the
challenge to conducting the Pledge in public schools, an issue still to be decided by the court.
t Professor of Clinical Law, New York University.
1 See Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow, 124 S Ct 384 (2003) (granting
certiorari).
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the constitutional rights of children and toward the administra-
tive powers of school officials, these cases imply that the Court,
since its earlier Pledge cases, may have become less inclined to
place limits on the authority of public school officials.
Accordingly, Part VII proposes that, rather than banning the
Pledge, schools could place the Pledge at the center of civics les-
sons on both the constitutional limits of state authority and the
dangers of governmental control. This Article concludes that we
can and should require public school officials to use the Pledge,
conducted within constitutional limits, as an opportunity to
teach children these fundamental lessons.
I. SUPREME COURT PLEDGE PRECEDENT
In Minersville School District v Gobitis,2 the Supreme Court
ruled that the Constitution does not require an exemption from
participation for Jehovah's Witnesses who are opposed to salut-
ing the flag of the United States in mandatory school ceremo-
nies. 3 As a result, the Court upheld a statute which required the
expulsion from public school of all students who refused, for
whatever reason, to participate in the flag salute ceremony.4 Af-
ter the Gobitis decision, in 1942, Congress codified the language
of the Pledge as: "I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United
States of America and to the Republic for which it stands, one
Nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."5
At about the same time, many state legislatures, including
West Virginia's, enacted new legislation requiring all schools "to
conduct courses of instruction in history, civics, and in the Con-
stitutions of the United States and of the State 'for the purpose of
teaching, fostering and perpetuating the ideals, principles and
spirit of Americanism, and increasing the knowledge of the or-
ganization and machinery of the government.'" 6 As a result, West
Virginia's State Board of Education directed that each school day
all teachers and students must participate in a salute and pledge
of allegiance to the American flag, and refusal to participate
would result in expulsion. 7
2 310 US 586 (1940).
3 See id at 597-98.
4 See id.
5 56 Stat 380 (1942), codified at 36 USC § 172 (1946).
6 West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 625 (1943).
7 See id at 629.
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Jehovah's Witnesses, seeking an exemption from the cere-
mony on the basis of the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause, challenged the West Virginia law. 8 But this time, the
Court chose not to reach the issue of an exemption from a re-
quirement to participate. Instead, in West Virginia School Board
v Barnette,9 the Court held that government lacks the power in
the first place to compel any of its citizens, including schoolchil-
dren, to demonstrate publicly their agreement with ideas or
views that the government deems correct.10
Gobitis assumed, without deciding, that "power exists in the
State to impose the flag salute discipline upon schoolchildren in
general."" The Court in Barnette declared the mandatory cere-
mony to be unconstitutional because it compelled "a form of ut-
terance," which "requires the individual to communicate by word
and sign his acceptance of the political ideas it thus bespeaks." 2
The Court observed that the combination of requiring a flag sa-
lute with utterance of the Pledge of Allegiance "requires affirma-
tion of a belief and an attitude of mind." 3
The Court held that, under the First Amendment, it does not
matter whether what the government demands people say or
believe is something that the Justices of the Court would regard
as "good, bad or merely innocuous." 4 In the Court's words:
[Validity of the asserted power to force an American citi-
zen publicly to profess any statement of belief or to en-
gage in any ceremony of assent to one, presents questions
of power that must be considered independently of any
idea we may have as to the utility of the ceremony in
question.15
8 Id.
9 319 US 624 (1943).
10 See id at 641 ('We set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of
Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here
is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority.").
11 See id at 635 (discussing the assumption in Gobitis that the State may impose a
flag salute requirement).
12 Id at 632, 633.
13 Barnette, 319 US at 633. "To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to
say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, left it
open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind." Id at 634.
14 Id.
15 Id.
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The opinion emphasized the potential ultimate cost to society if
state officials could force any citizens, but particularly children,
to express a particular view. 16 Since 1943, public schools have
been allowed to conduct a flag salute and Pledge of Allegiance
ceremony, but the schools could not require students to partici-
pate.
Now, more than sixty years later, the Court was to decide a
question that Barnette took for granted, but never ruled upon:
whether the Constitution allows state officials to recite the
Pledge in public schools.' 7 The reason this question is being
asked is because eleven years after Barnette was decided, Con-
gress changed the Pledge by inserting the words "under God"
after the word "nation." 8
If this looks like a shocking question, that is because there
are an ever shrinking number of Americans who grew up before
the Pledge was recited in public schools. Moreover, the vast ma-
jority of American adults today who grew up in the United States
learned the Pledge after the inclusion of "under God." One would
have to be older than sixty-five years of age to have entered
school before "under God" was part of the Pledge. Because it is
shocking for many even to think that such a thing is unconstitu-
tional, I predict that the Court will eventually declare that the
Constitution does not forbid the recitation of the Pledge in public
school. But, instead of using this history as a basis for a predic-
tion, I want to use it as a basis for saying something extremely
important about American principles of freedom and their con-
nection to children's rights: that children should not have to wait
until they are adults to learn lessons about the limits we place on
governmental power and the dangers of governmental control.
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S NEWDOW DECISION
In Newdow v US Congress,19 a Panel of the Ninth Circuit
ruled unconstitutional a California school district's policy requir-
ing "[elach elementary school class [to] recite the pledge of alle-
giance to the flag once each day"20 because this policy violates the
16 See Barnette, 319 US at 636-37.
17 See Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow, 124 S Ct 384 (2003) (granting
certiorari).
18 68 Stat 249 (1954), codified at 36 USC § 172 (1958).
19 328 F3d 466 (9th Cir 2003).
20 Id at 483.
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Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 21 The case was
brought by the father of an elementary-school-aged girl.22 New-
dow, an atheist, opposes his daughter's attending public school
where state officials recite, and encourage students to recite, the
words "under God."23 Newdow never married his daughter's
mother, though he provided a house in Sacramento for the
mother and his daughter during the early part of his daughter's
life. 24 At the time Newdow filed his lawsuit in federal district
court, he was not living with his daughter or her mother; the
mother was the primary caregiver and Newdow enjoyed unoffi-
cial visitation privileges. 25 After the lawsuit was filed, the mother
obtained a court order awarding her full custody rights, includ-
ing the right to make all educational decisions for her daughter. 26
Newdow continued to possess visitation rights.27
The mother then filed a motion to dismiss the federal case on
the ground that Newdow lacked standing.28 She successfully ar-
gued that Newdow may not name his daughter as a party to the
lawsuit against the mother's wishes because, under California
law, the custodial parent has the responsibility "to make the de-
cisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of" her
daughter. 29 The Ninth Circuit, however, ruled that Newdow had
standing to bring the case for himself, holding that "a noncusto-
dial parent, who retains some parental rights, may have stand-
ing to maintain a federal lawsuit to the extent that his assertion
of retained parental rights under state law is not legally incom-
patible with the custodial parent's assertion of rights."30 Though
he still needed to show "injury in fact that is fairly traceable to
21 See id at 490.
22 See id at 482. The opinion tells us nothing more about the child, and news articles
reveal only that at the time of the initial law suit the daughter was eight years old. Adam
Tanner, Girl whose father sued over 'under God' recites the Pledge, San Diego Union-Trib
A5 (May 2, 2003).
23 See Newdow, 328 F3d at 483.
24 See Charles Lane, An Allegiance to Dissent, Wash Post Al (Dec 2, 2003). See also
Tony Mauro, The Custody Dispute Behind the Pledge of Allegiance Case, 174 NJ L J 474
(2003) (noting that when his daughter turned five, Newdow asked the mother and daugh-
ter to move to Florida to be near him).
25 See Lane, Allegiance to Dissent, Wash Post at Al (cited in note 24).
26 Newdow v US Congress, 313 F3d 500, 502 (9th Cir 2003) (quoting text of custody
order).
27 See Lane, Allegiance to Dissent, Wash Post at Al (cited in note 24).
28 Newdow, 313 F3d at 501.
29 Id at 505, citing Cal Farn Code § 3006.
30 Id at 503-04.
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the challenged action,"31 Newdow made that showing to the sat-
isfaction of the Panel.
The Panel reasoned that because, under California law, non-
custodial parents with the visitation rights that Newdow pos-
sessed may expose their children to their preferred religious
views (regardless of the religious views of the custodial parent),
Newdow has a legally recognized interest in the religious up-
bringing of his child.32 As a result, the Panel ruled that Newdow
has standing as a parent to prevent harms to himself resulting
from the recitation of the Pledge in his daughter's class.33 The
Panel based its ruling, in part, on the ground that the mother
"may not consent to unconstitutional government action in dero-
gation of" the father's rights. 34 The father possessed the right "to
be free from the government's endorsing a particular view of re-
ligion and unconstitutionally indoctrinating his impressionable
young daughter on a daily basis in that official view."35
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S GRANT OF CERTIORARI
In Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow, 36 the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to the Ninth Circuit enumerating
two questions: (1) whether Newdow has standing to challenge as
unconstitutional a public school district policy that requires
teachers to lead willing students in reciting the Pledge of Alle-
giance, and (2) whether a public school district policy that re-
quires teachers to lead willing students in reciting the Pledge of
Allegiance, which includes the words "under God," violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as applied
through the Fourteenth Amendment.37
A. Standing
Although the standing issue is problematic, and the Court
might well reverse on that ground without reaching the merits of
the constitutional question, the merits of the case have caught
the public's attention and deserve to be addressed. Even if the
31 Id at 504.
32 See Newdow, 313 F3d at 504.
33 See id at 505.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 124 S Ct 384 (2003) (granting certiorari).
37 See id.
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Court dismisses Newdow on standing grounds, another case will
surely be brought by a parent who unquestionably has standing.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Newdow's standing as a fa-
ther is attenuated at best. He was denied the right to bring the
case on his daughter's behalf because the mother has the sub-
stantive right under California law to direct her daughter's edu-
cation. Additionally, the mother does not wish to have her
daughter challenge the conditions of her own education. Thus,
Newdow's standing depends entirely on a showing that as a fa-
ther he suffers a cognizable injury because his daughter's teacher
recites the Pledge in the classroom. 38
There is little to say to support the claim that Newdow suf-
fers an "injury in fact" because his daughter attends a public
school which recites the Pledge each day. His injury surely can-
not be that his daughter is exposed to religious training with
which he disagrees. His daughter's mother has the right to ex-
pose the child to whatever religious indoctrination she desires.
Yet, the Ninth Circuit Panel reasoned that because Califor-
nia substantive law, absent a showing of harm to the child, re-
fuses "to place restraints on a noncustodial parent who wished to
expose his children to his particular religious views,"39 Newdow
retains a legally recognized interest in his daughter's religious
upbringing.40 The Panel held that because the mother's right to
direct the religious upbringing of her daughter without interfer-
ence by the father did not include the power "to insist that her
child be subjected to unconstitutional state action," Newdow has
sufficient parental rights to secure standing in federal court.41
B. Banning the Pledge
It would hardly be surprising for the Court to conclude that
Newdow lacks standing and reverse without reaching the merits.
At the same time, it is likely that at least some Justices would
like to address the merits in order to reverse (and likely con-
demn) a widely unpopular ruling.42
38 See Newdow, 313 F3d at 504-05.
39 Id at 504.
40 Id.
41 Id at 505.
42 The decision certainly was among the most discussed and ridiculed of any federal
court pronouncement over the past several years. See, for example, D. Chris Albright, The
Words "Under God" Do Not Render the Pledge of Allegiance Unconstitutional, Nev Law 9
(May 11, 2003) ("The history of the Establishment Clause's enactment, the Supreme
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2004:
There is a long history of the Court paying scrupulous atten-
tion to circumstances in which public schools entangle them-
selves with religion or religious ceremony.43 The Court's prior
decisions arose within the parameters of fundamental American
principles regarding the role of the government in childrearing."
These principles, combined with the related prohibition against
the government undertaking any role in religious training or in-
doctrination, stand for a limited state role in religious value in-
culcation in children.
As a result, the Court has issued a number of rulings strik-
ing down advancement and perceived advancement of religion in
the public schools. It is unconstitutional for public schools to
permit a student-led prayer before football games,45 to open a
graduation ceremony with a prayer,46 to require the teaching of
creation science, 47 to employ a moment of silent prayer,48 to post
the Ten Commandments on a classroom wall,49 to forbid the
Court's rulings in Establishment Clause cases, and the history of the country since inclu-
sion of the words "under God" to the Pledge, all demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit got it
wrong."); Charlotte Allen, Pledge of Allegiance: 'Under God': An 'Injury' with Almost No
Victims, LA Times M3 (Oct 5, 2003) (describing the Ninth Circuit as famous for "loopy,
ultra-liberal rulings"); Joseph Perkins, Separating God from Country, San Diego Union-
Trib B9 (May 2, 2003) (describing Newdow's decision to bring a federal lawsuit over the
recitation of the Pledge as "outrageous").
43 See, for example, McCollum v Board of Education of School District No 71, Cham-
paign County, IL, 333 US 203, 231 (1948) ("In no activity of the State is it more vital to
keep out divisive forces than in its schools."); Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962) (holding
that use of the public school system to encourage recitation of prayer was inconsistent
with the Establishment Clause, even though pupils were not required to participate).
44 See Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923) (holding a law forbidding the teaching of
a foreign language prior to eighth grade unconstitutional as interfering with the liberty
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment); Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925)
(holding a law establishing compulsory public education unconstitutional as interfering
with the liberty of parents to direct the education of their children); Wisconsin v Yoder,
406 US 205 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a law that required Amish parents to send
their children to formal high school); Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57 (2000) (striking down
a broad statute permitting third-party visitation petitions because it violated the funda-
mental right of parents to rear their children).
45 Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe, 530 US 290, 312 (2000) ("[Ihe deliv-
ery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing those present to participate in
an act of religious worship.").
46 Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577, 587 (1992) (holding that a nonsectarian prayer at a
public school graduation ceremony is impermissible because the state "may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise to act in a way
which establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so") (internal quota-
tions omitted).
47 Edwards v Aquillard, 482 US 578 (1987) (defining "creation science" as a religious
theory that a supernatural being created humankind).
48 Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38 (1985).
49 Stone v Graham, 449 US 39 (1980) (per curiam).
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teaching of evolution, 50 to read daily from the Bible,51 or to read a
"denominationally neutral" prayer. 52 This analysis is based, to a
certain extent, on the age of the children involved. 53 While courts
seem to be much more protective of elementary schoolchildren,
and slightly less so of those in secondary education, these deci-
sions make clear the Court's contempt of religious indoctrination
endorsed by the school at any level of public education for chil-
dren.54
At this point, it is useful to separate two questions. The first
is the constitutionality of the enactment of the federal law that
includes "under God" in the Pledge. The other is the constitu-
tionality of the recitation of the Pledge in the public school set-
ting. There is no doubt, of course, that if it were unconstitutional
to place "under God" in the Pledge, it would be unconstitutional
to recite the Pledge with those words in it. But, as Newdow
reaches the Supreme Court, it is not the Pledge itself that has
been held to be unconstitutional, only its recitation in the public
schools. Newdow held that reciting the Pledge "impermissibly
coerces a religious act."55 It did not also conclude that the phrase
"under God" itself constitutes an establishment of religion. 56
For the remainder of this Article, I assume it was constitu-
tional for Congress to insert "under God" into the Pledge. Others,
better versed in the First Amendment's religion clauses, have
more to say on whether this assumption is correct. My special
interest lies in examining what we expect of public schools when
educating children and in the implications in other contexts of
the Ninth Circuit Panel's conclusion that public schools may not
allow Pledge recitations in their classrooms-again, assuming
that the Pledge itself is constitutional.
50 Epperson v Arkansas, 393 US 97 (1968).
51 Abington School District v Schempp, 374 US 203 (1963).
52 Engel, 370 US at 421.
53 For example, in Aguillard, the Court noted that it "has been particularly vigilant
in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary or secondary
schools" and contrasted this with the lesser care taken with universities, where older
students may choose to enroll in classes that may have religious content. Aguillard, 482
US at 584. The Court in Epperson declared that "the vigilant protections of constitutional
freedoms is no where more vital than in the community of American schools." Epperson,
393 US at 104 (internal citations omitted). And in Rodriguez, the Court discussed the
particular susceptibility of adolescents to peer pressure. Santa Fe, 530 US at 311.
54 See, for example, Santa Fe, 530 US at 315 ("We refuse to turn a blind eye to the
context in which this policy arose, and that context quells any doubt that this policy was
implemented with the purpose of endorsing school prayer.").
55 Newdow, 328 F3d at 487.
56 See id.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
If the Panel's reasoning that the words "under God" in the
Pledge of Allegiance means its recitation constitutes a religious
ceremony, then its conclusion that the First Amendment is vio-
lated when it is recited in public school logically follows. But the
premise is highly suspect."
Well established constitutional doctrine makes clear that a
court is not supposed to isolate a word or symbol in assessing
whether an object or undertaking constitutes endorsement or
advancement of religion: instead, an object or undertaking must
be evaluated in context.58 For this reason, the Supreme Court
deemed even the deeply religious Christian symbol of a nativity
scene as not advancing religion when erected by a city.5 9
Since Lee v Weisman,60 courts must consider the impact on
the listener or viewer in determining whether state action vio-
lates the Establishment Clause.61 In Lee, the Court found uncon-
stitutional the practice of including invocations and benedictions
at public school graduation ceremonies, declaring that school of-
ficials "may not coerce anyone to support or participate in relig-
ion or its exercise, or otherwise to act in a way which establishes
a state religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."62 The Su-
preme Court was able to rely upon precedent which recognizes
"heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from
subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public
schools."63 More than fifty years ago, Justice Frankfurter
stressed that with respect to school-aged children, "[tihe law of
imitation operates" because "non-conformity is not an out-
standing characteristic of children."64
57 As the dissenting opinion in the denial of rehearing en banc noted, " [i]f reciting the
Pledge is truly 'a religious act' in violation of the Establishment Clause, then so is the
recitation of the Constitution itself, the Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg
Address, the National Motto, or the singing of the National Anthem." Id at 473
(O'Scannlain dissenting) (noting that "In God we trust" is the United States' national
motto, 36 USC § 302 (2002)).
58 See Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 679-81 (1984).
59 Id. See also County of Allegheny v ACLU, 492 US 573 (1989) (holding that display-
ing a menorah next to a Christmas tree did not have the unconstitutional effect of endors-
ing the Christian and Jewish faiths).
60 505 US 577 (1992).
61 Id at 592. See, for example, Good News Club v Milford Central School, 533 US 98,
116 (2001).
62 Lee, 505 US at 587 (citations omitted).
63 Id at 592 (citations omitted).
64 McCollum, 333 US at 227 (Frankfurter concurring).
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The Newdow Panel concluded that merely reciting the
Pledge puts the "students in the untenable position of choosing
between participating in an exercise with religious content or
protesting."65 The Panel was particularly concerned with the im-
pact on young children because the "coercive effect of the policy
here is particularly pronounced in the school setting given the
age and impressionability of schoolchildren, and their under-
standing that they are required to adhere to the norms set by
their school, their teacher and their fellow students."66 The con-
stitutional solution, according to the Panel, is to prohibit the
Pledge's recitation in public school.67
IV. ANALYZING THE PLEDGE'S EFFECT ON SCHOOLCHILDREN
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the merits of the Newdow
case stands in sharp contrast with a central assumption in
Barnette.68 Since Barnette was decided in 1943, it has been clear
that, although public school officials may conduct Pledge cere-
monies in class, students cannot be forced to participate in public
ceremonies such as flag saluting and pledging allegiance. 69 In
Barnette, the Court focused on the impermissibility of school offi-
cials punishing students who choose (for any reason) not to sa-
lute the flag or not to recite the Pledge of Allegiance.7 0
It is difficult to overstate the significance of the Barnette
holding. West Virginia's justification for the mandatory Pledge
ceremony, written in 1942 in the midst of war fever, could easily
have been the product of any state school board in the wake of
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon.7 1 Stressing that "national unity is the basis of na-
tional security," that the flag "is the symbol of our National
Unity transcending all internal differences," and declaring that
65 Newdow, 328 F3d at 488.
66 Id.
67 Public officials may not "coerce impressionable young schoolchildren to recite [the
Pledge], or even to stand mute while it is being recited by their classmates." Id at 489.
68 Barnette, 319 US at 624.
69 See id at 642.
70 See id at 634.
71 That such a sentiment could arise again in the wake of such attacks is not far-
fetched. Immediately after the attacks of September 11th, the House and Senate passed a
concurrent resolution "[e]xpressing the sense of the Congress that, as a symbol of solidar-
ity following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, every
United States citizen is encouraged to display the flag of the United States." H Con Res
225, 107th Cong, 1st Sess (Sept 12, 2001), in 147 Cong Rec S 9410 (Sept 13, 2001).
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the flag is an "emblem of freedom in its truest, best sense [and]
that it signifies government resting on the consent of the gov-
erned, liberty regulated by law, protection of the weak against
the strong, security against the exercise of arbitrary power, and
absolute safety for free institutions against foreign aggression,"
the West Virginia Board of Education required all public school
students to pledge allegiance each day in school. 72 The rule was
enacted on the premise that schoolchildren are in "the formative
period in the development in citizenship" and that teaching chil-
dren the values of patriotism is an important, and legitimate,
aspect of their education. 73 These are powerful sentiments which
resonate with many Americans today. Indeed, they are so strong
that it is appropriate to wonder if the current Court would decide
Barnette the same way today. But before looking more closely at
the question of what the current Court would do, it is instructive
to study carefully what the Barnette Court said.
A. The Barnette Reasoning
Justice Jackson's opinion in Barnette focused on the limita-
tions of government officials to force ideas upon citizens. "We set
up government by consent of the governed," he reasoned, "and
the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to
coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by public
opinion, not public opinion by authority."74 Justice Jackson found
it particularly important that the required recitation of the
Pledge was to be imposed on children: "That they are educating
the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to stran-
gle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount impor-
tant principles of our government as mere platitudes."75
According to Barnette, the threat to democracy was more
compelling precisely because the state sought to compel children
to believe certain ideas. If the state could standardize the next
generation's beliefs, the state could control the people and by
stealth transform American democracy into blind adherence to
state-identified values.76 Instead, American principles of democ-
72 See Barnette, 319 US at 627-28 n 2.
73 Id.
74 Id at 641.
75 Id at 637.
76 See Barnette, 319 US at 640-42.
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racy, according to Barnette, call for maximization of ideas.77
Through pluralism and a maximally diverse set of ideas, the
American people will reach the best choices for self-rule. 78
But Barnette ruled that as long as students were not forced
to participate in the Pledge ceremony, it was acceptable to per-
form it. 79 The Court assumed either that schoolchildren pos-
sessed the individual capacity to decide whether to participate,
or that, even if many would feel pressured to participate, these
pressures were acceptable as long as children were not literally
forced to participate.
The Newdow Panel assumed the opposite. It ruled that be-
cause of the age and impressionability of schoolchildren, reciting
the Pledge has an impermissibly coercive effect on students. Stu-
dents are likely to regard the Pledge as a message of endorse-
ment of religion and disapproval of beliefs questioning the exis-
tence of God.80 The Panel ruled that such coercion is unconstitu-
tional because of the Pledge's religious overtones.8'
B. Children's Understanding of "Under God"
Courts ordinarily evaluate the constitutionality of certain
actions, such as placing a creche in a public square, with refer-
ence to the reaction of a reasonable adult.8 2 But in primary or
secondary school, determining whether a particular action has a
coercive effect on a school's captive audience requires considering
its impact on children, rather than adults. The Court in Santa Fe
Independent School District v Doe83 held that adolescents attend-
ing a high school football game were particularly likely to feel the
social pressure to conform and participate in a shared prayer
ceremony arranged by the school officials.84 In effect, Santa Fe
held that because adolescents are particularly prone to such so-
cial pressure, and also are of sufficient maturity and intelligence
77 See id at 642.
78 Nearly seventy-five years ago, the Court explicitly rejected a "general power of the
State to standardize its children." Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 535 (1925).
79 Barnette, 319 US at 640 ("National unity as an end which officials may foster by
persuasion and example is not in question.").
80 See Newdow, 328 F3d at 488.
81 See id at 488.
82 See Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 685-87 (1984).
83 530 US 290 (2000).
84 See id at 311.
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to comprehend the religious meaning of the event, schools may
not begin events with a prayer.8 5
Thus, the identity of the audience makes all the difference.
That is why it is not unconstitutional to begin each congressional
session with a prayer.86 The congressional audience understands
that the prayer is not a governmental endorsement of religion.
But not all age groups of children are alike, and what may be
impermissible for adolescents may be acceptable for primary
school-age children.87
The Panel has conceptualized elementary school-age chil-
dren as both too sophisticated and too young. Though too young
to resist the coercive impact of their environment, they are so
sophisticated that the words "under God" in the Pledge "may
reasonably appear to be an attempt to enforce a 'religious ortho-
doxy' of monotheism."88 One may concede that adults who pay
careful attention to the words of the Pledge may fear that "under
God" suggests an endorsement of religion, just as Judges Good-
win and Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit did.8 9 But this hardly
means that primary school-aged children would do the same
thing. It requires a sophistication unassociated with primary
school-aged children to think that way.
School-aged children likely pay far less attention to the
words in the Pledge than their elders may hope. Educators do
not fail to appreciate this. The significance of the Pledge's public
recitation is not in the words but in the communal act of partici-
pating. Thus, the Panel need not have been wrong in concluding
that, given the age and impressionability of school-aged children,
they are likely to feel pressured ("coerced") into participating.
The Panel's error was in suggesting that the addition of the
words "under God" adds anything to the pressure students feel.
85 See id at 317.
86 Marsh v Chambers, 463 US 783 (1983) (holding that the Nebraska Legislature's
practice of beginning each session with a prayer by a state-paid chaplain does not violate
the Establishment Clause). The Court has never ruled that the Constitution allows a
prayer at the opening of Congress, but the Court has made reference to Congress's prayer
a number of times, indicating in dicta that the practice is constitutional. See, for example,
Lynch, 465 US at 686; Abington School District v Schempp, 374 US 203, 213 (1963).
87 Several years ago, Emily Buss wisely suggested that decisions about how the law
treats children would be improved if lawmakers studied more carefully the developmental
literature and, consequently, made better informed judgments about children. See Emily
Buss, The Adolescent's Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control Between Parent and
State, 67 U Chi L Rev 1233, 1255-56 (2000).
8 Newdow, 328 F3d at 488.
89 See id (opinion by Goodwin and joined by Reinhardt).
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The problem, of course, is that those two words stand out more in
the minds of the Newdow Panel's majority than they do in the
minds of the children engaging in the ritual.
The Supreme Court would be more likely to uphold the re-
sult in Newdow if the words "under God" had been inserted into
the Pledge in 2002, instead of in 1954. If the words were newly
inserted, children attending school would be aware that some-
thing had changed and that, for some reason, they must now say
that the nation was founded "under God" when that was not true
before.90 The opponents to the Pledge would be able to predict a
negative impact on a generation of children.
Having waited nearly fifty years to challenge the Pledge,
however, opponents cannot argue persuasively that most Ameri-
cans (which means, of course, most people who, during their
childhood, recited the current version of the Pledge) consider the
Pledge to constitute an endorsement of religion by the govern-
ment. From most accounts, Americans well comprehend the dif-
ference between government establishing or endorsing religion
on the one hand, and permitting government to recognize the
importance of religion in the lives of many Americans on the
other.
90 Another reason it would be more likely that a challenge to the Pledge would be
sustained in 1954 than in 2004 is the impact these temporal differences have on the deci-
sionmaker. As Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner have shown in a book applying
the teachings of cognitive psychology and narrative theory to the practice of law, the
central storyline that is at the core of most narratives can also be found in legal narra-
tives at the trial and appellate levels. That storyline begins with the disruption of a
"Steady State" by the emergence of "Trouble," and it proceeds with the confrontation and
eventual resolution of the Trouble, culminating in the restoration of a Steady State. See
Anthony G. Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner, Minding the Law 110-13, 134-42 (Harvard
2000). Had Newdow been litigated in 1954, the Steady State would have been the Pledge
as it existed at that time: a statement that was exclusively patriotic and lacked any reli-
gious connotations. At that point in time, the trouble would have been Congress's desire
to add religion to the Pledge. Under these circumstances, Congress would have been the
antagonist (and, perhaps, the villain) of the story. All of these elements would have
driven the "story" to a resolution in which the Trouble is vanquished by preventing the
addition of religion to the Pledge. But Newdow reads like a very different story at this
point in our history. Now, the Steady State is the Pledge as it has been recited for nearly
fifty years, with no observable harmful effects. See Newdow, 328 F3d at 493 (Fernandez
concurring and dissenting) (finding that the Pledge had not caused any real harm since it
was amended in 1954). The disruption of the Steady State (the Trouble) is Newdow's
displeasure with the state of affairs. Now, Newdow is the antagonist (and, to read the
editorials commenting on the case, clearly the villain, too). Thus, the previous transfor-
mation of the Pledge and the longstanding acceptance of the Pledge in its current form
point the way to the proper outcome, just as any good story flows naturally from the be-
ginning to the end. In the story as it reads now, the most logical and fitting ending is to
uphold the familiar Steady State.
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For all of these reasons, the Panel's conclusion that "[t]he
'subtle and indirect' social pressure which permeates the class-
room also renders more acute the message sent to non-believing
schoolchildren that they are outsiders" seems wrong.91 If it was
wrong to suggest that school-aged children feel particularly pres-
sured to participate in the Pledge because it contains the words
"under God," however, the Panel certainly was right to suggest
that school-aged children feel pressured to recite the Pledge in
public schools. In the Panel's words, elementary and secondary
public school "students are subjected to peer pressure and public
pressure which is 'as real as any overt compulsion.' '9 2
V. PRESSURES ON CHILDREN TO RECITE THE PLEDGE
What's left to consider, then, is the constitutional signifi-
cance of Newdow's insight concerning the pressure to conform
felt by schoolchildren. Does Newdow stand for the proposition
that it is perfectly acceptable to coerce children into patriotic
displays, but that the state goes too far when the display con-
tains the phrase "under God"?
This question suggests that we ought to revisit Barnette it-
self and reconsider whether leading the Pledge's recitation (even
without "under God") should be constitutionally permissible. Was
not an important principle in Barnette that school officials may
not coerce students to utter ideas? Should it matter if the "coer-
cion" is explicit or implicit? If courts must consider whether it is
meaningful to expect primary school students to possess the ma-
turity and self-assuredness to invoke their rights not to partici-
pate in public rituals, this may mean that teachers should be
prohibited from asking them to recite the Pledge, even in the ab-
sence of "under God."
At The University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium 93 at
which I presented this Article, I asked the audience (about sev-
enty members, most of whom were law students) to indicate
whether they had attended a primary school at which the Pledge
of Allegiance was recited daily. Virtually every member of the
audience indicated that they had. Then I asked how many knew
91 Newdow, 328 F3d at 488 n 5, quoting Lee, 505 US at 592-93.
92 Id. This does not mean that there is no difference between overt compulsion and
peer pressure or that primary schoolchildren are unable to discern the difference.
93 The University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium, "The Public and Private Faces
of Family Law," October 2003. See <http://legal-forum.uchicago.edu/LFSymposium.htm>
(visited May 15, 2004).
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that they had no obligation to participate (not to mention a con-
stitutional right to refuse to do so). Only one member of the audi-
ence claimed to know.
For better or worse, this has become the legacy of Barnette,
one of the most eloquent statements of the limitations on state
officials to indoctrinate citizens (of whatever age) ever penned by
the Court. School boards and teachers go about their daily busi-
ness as if Barnette had ruled that teachers may require all stu-
dents in the class to recite the Pledge. If the paradigmatic Mar-
tian were to attend any public primary school classroom in the
United States at the beginning of the day and was asked to guess
the law concerning the Pledge of Allegiance, he would surely con-
clude that it is permissible for school officials to require that all
students participate in this patriotic ritual.
Even if the Newdow Panel was correct that patriotic rituals
in public schools are conducted with an understanding that stu-
dents are likely to feel compelled to join in, this does not prove
that the Constitution is offended. There is a crucial difference
between students being forced to do something because of peer
pressure and because their failure to conform will result in offi-
cial punishment.
Moreover, children can discern the difference between overt
compulsion and peer pressure. Even young children recognize
when they have a choice in the matter, regardless of whether
they have any interest in exercising their freedom. They under-
stand that when they do something because they are succumbing
to their friends' pressure, they retain an important measure of
choice that is completely lacking when a teacher assigns them a
task which they must perform or suffer a sanction.
Indeed, part of growing up involves the tentative use of such
freedom in various experiments children conduct as they pro-
gress to independence. In this sense, the unavoidable exposure to
this soft form of "coercion"-to which students commonly suc-
cumb-is a useful aspect of their education and growth. It is true
that childhood is a period of exaggerated imitation when peer
pressure is very strong, but this hardly means that students are
unaware of it, or do not feel they are exercising personal choice
when they decide to do what others are doing.
VI. BALANCING INTERESTS
The remaining question is whether, in light of this impor-
tant distinction, the Constitution ought to require educators to
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clarify which form of "coercion" is involved in state-sponsored
events. The all-or-nothing quality of Newdow is too categorical.
The Newdow Panel's response to the unavoidable coercion in the
classroom is to forbid the recitation of the Pledge. This is not only
extreme, it also demonstrates an extremely limited perception of
the capacity of schools and teachers to educate.
Justice Ginsberg recently quoted Justice Brandeis's famous
observation that "[g]overnment is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its ex-
ample."94 And she correctly observed that "government is no-
where more a teacher than when it runs a public school."9 5 It
may be that, in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, the
Newdow Panel shied away from relying on public educators to
teach important constitutional lessons.
Perhaps the Panel was able to imagine a broader educa-
tional role for public school teachers, but, because of recent Su-
preme Court pronouncements, it feared how teachers would dis-
charge their role. This fear may have led the Panel in Newdow to
settle for the lesser of two evils. Banishing the Pledge may have
seemed to the Panel the safer course in light of recent Supreme
Court precedent. The Supreme Court's caselaw-especially in the
First Amendment context, but also regarding privacy-related
issues addressed in Fourth Amendment cases-suggests that the
Court believes it is important, above everything else, to teach
children to be obedient and respectful of teachers, principals, and
other students. 96 No one can doubt the importance of such les-
sons. But these lessons are also something one would expect to-
talitarian regimes to emphasize. The issue is not whether these
lessons are important, but whether we can afford to teach them
at the cost of principles of American freedom.
Over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has decided
a number of cases concerning the power of teachers to regulate
the conduct of students in school. 97 These decisions, in the aggre-
gate, suggest that the Court has a different vision of the function
of public educators than it did when it decided Barnette. Even if
its vision of the educator's primary function has not changed sig-
nificantly, the modern Court appears to place a far greater em-
94 Board of Education of Independent School District No 92 v Earls, 536 US 822, 855
(2002) (Ginsberg dissenting), quoting Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438, 485 (1928).
95 Earls, 536 US at 855.
96 See Parts VI A-B (discussing these cases).
97 Id.
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phasis on the need for, and appropriateness of, disciplining chil-
dren and teaching them how to behave properly than the Court
did two generations ago. Though it may be too much to suggest
that the Rehnquist Court would overturn Barnette, a number of
its rulings suggest that the Court holds that teaching children to
be obedient is among the most important foundational values for
future citizenship.
A. Restrictions on Students' First Amendment Rights
This shift in emphasis is evident in a series of First Amend-
ment and Fourth Amendment cases decided between 1984 and
2002. The Court has never repudiated the claim in Tinker v Des
Moines Independent Community School District98 that students
are "persons" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 99 and that students do not shed their constitutional rights
at the schoolhouse door.100 Nonetheless, since 1986 the Court has
paid strange homage to the rule that the First Amendment
places limits on the actions of public schools. In that year, the
Court ruled that even though the First Amendment technically
applies, school officials may punish students for making speeches
that the officials deem "inappropriate."1 1
In Bethel School District No 403 v Fraser,10 2 a student gave a
speech at a high school assembly which contained sexual meta-
phors.10 3 The student, insufficiently certain of the appropriate-
ness of the speech, asked two faculty advisors to read it before-
hand.10 4 They neither forbade him to give the speech nor warned
him that he was violating a school rule by doing so, although
both informed him that it was inappropriate and that he proba-
bly should not deliver it.105 Though the advisors did not officially
authorize the speech, the student reasonably could have con-
strued their noncommital reaction as implicit consent. 06
After the student delivered the speech, his principal
promptly suspended him for three days and removed his name
98 393 US 503 (1969).
99 Id at 511.
100 Id at 506.
101 Bethel School District No 403 v Fraser, 478 US 675, 683 (1986).
102 478 US 675 (1986).
103 Id at 678.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See Fraser, 478 US at 695 (Stevens dissenting).
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from the list of candidates for graduation speaker. 0 7 The Su-
preme Court reasoned that the power to punish students for
their speech is consistent with the First Amendment because the
school was performing its important role as an educator of the
next generation, a generation that needs to be taught "the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior." 08 These bounda-
ries, the Court made clear, are among the things that students
must learn as "necessary to the maintenance of a democratic po-
litical system."10 9
Two years later, in Hazelwood School District v Kuhl-
meier, 10 a principal committed the greatest of First Amendment
sins: he engaged in prior restraint. The principal censored-by
excising two pages from the student-written school newspaper-
because he considered the content inappropriate."' One of the
excised articles dealt with teen pregnancy in the school. Al-
though no names were used, the principal claimed to be con-
cerned that the students interviewed were too easily identifi-
able.1' 2 The other article related to the impact of divorce on stu-
dents. This time, the principal refused to permit its publication
because a student, who was identified by name, had complained
about her father's behavior, and the father had not been given an
opportunity to respond." 3
The principal's conduct was sustained by the Supreme Court
because "educators do not offend the First Amendment by exer-
cising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns."1" 4 Moreover, because of the limited expertise of federal
judges in matters of education, the Court stressed that "the edu-
cation of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of par-
ents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of fed-
eral judges."115
107 See id at 678.
108 Id at 681.
109 Id at 683 (citations omitted).
110 484 US 260 (1988).
111 Id at 265.
112 Id at 263.
113 See id at 263-64.
114 Kuhlmeier, 484 US at 273.
115 Id (citations omitted).
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Never mind that the principal never explained his actions to
the students, whose weeks of hard work producing the articles
were erased, or that the newspaper's masthead promised the
students a publication based on a commitment to the values of
responsible, free speech. 116 If the principal thought that the arti-
cles should not be published, and justified his censorship as ad-
vancing the students' education," 7 the Court was satisfied with
that result.
B. Restrictions on Students' Fourth Amendment Rights
The Supreme Court's treatment of the Fourth Amendment
in public schools closely parallels its treatment of the First
Amendment. In 1985, the Court ruled that the Fourth Amend-
ment applies to searches of students conducted by school offi-
cials. 18 But, it promptly added, "strict compliance" with the
Amendment's probable cause requirements is not required for
"the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren"
because of "the substantial need of teachers and administrators
for freedom to maintain order in the schools." 9
In 1995, the Court struggled to justify a rule under the
Fourth Amendment that would permit school officials to conduct
random, suspicionless searches of student athletes. 20 In Verno-
nia School District 47J v Acton,' 2 1 the Court reasoned that
schools fall within the "special needs" rule of Skinner v Railway
Labor Executives' Association 22 Because school officials per-
ceived an "epidemic" of drug use among student athletes, a spe-
cial need existed to discourage drug use among student athletes
or to discover such use in order to treat the students. 23 Students
may be searched, in other words, when educators believe doing
116 Id.
117 Justice Brennan's famous and insightful criticism of the majority opinion is that
the lessons the principal communicated were "particularly insidious from one to whom
the public entrusts the task of inculcating in its youth an appreciation for the cherished
democratic liberties that our Constitution guarantees." Id at 290 (Brennan dissenting).
118 New Jersey v TLO, 469 US 325 (1985).
119 Id at 341.
120 Veronia School District 47J v Acton, 515 US 646 (1995).
121 515 US 646 (1995).
122 Acton, 515 US at 653, citing Skinner v Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489
US 602, 620-21 (1989) (upholding drug testing of railway conductors because the situa-
tion presents 'special needs' to prevent accidents due to drug or alcohol usage and to
regulate safety).
123 See Acton, 515 US at 663.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
so serves the best interests of the students. Because the school's
relationship to children is "custodial and tutelary," officials regu-
larly exercise "a degree of supervision and control that could not
be exercised over free adults."1 24 Because children, unlike adults,
are always in some form of custody, state officials may take ac-
tions with respect to children that would obviously offend the
Fourth Amendment.125
But by 2002, the exception became the rule. Acton was about
addressing an emergency and fashioning an appropriate re-
sponse to a drug-use epidemic, but Board of Education of Indi-
ana School Dist No 92 of Pottawatomie County v Earls126 con-
cerned a school district regulation permitting the random testing
of virtually every student-a dramatic expansion over the ath-
lete-only rule of Acton--even in the absence of extensive drug use
among the students. The Court found that the school's decision
to randomly test every student who "voluntarily" took part in any
extracurricular activity was an "entirely reasonable" method of
preventing at least some drug usage among students. 27 The
Court deemed the policy to be a "reasonably effective means" for
"preventing, deterring, and detecting drug use."128 For these pur-
poses, it is constitutionally irrelevant that all students with an
interest in going to college are almost certain to feel constrained
to participate in extracurricular activities. Indeed, the more stu-
dents who can be subjected to drug testing, the better. Not be-
cause those students plausibly waived their privacy rights, but
rather, according to Justice Thomas in Earls, because the public
school's mission as "guardian and tutor" includes the responsibil-
ity "for maintaining discipline, health, and safety." 29 These
choices are constitutional because in public schools, the govern-
ment acts as a child's "guardian and tutor" with responsibility
"for maintaining discipline, health, and safety."130
This line of cases addressing both the First Amendment and
Fourth Amendment provide reasons to wonder whether the cur-
rent Court's vision of the teacher's role in educating children
would permit requiring students to recite the Pledge as part of
124 Id at 655.
125 See id at 654.
126 536 US 822 (2002).
127 See id at 836.
128 Id at 837.
129 Id at 830.
130 Earls, 536 US at 830.
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developing the future citizen's patriotism. The modern rule has
granted an enormous measure of authority to teachers and
school officials to conduct business as they see fit, limited only by
the requirement that their decisions be deemed "rational" if re-
viewed by federal judges. If Barnette were not already precedent,
one could easily imagine the current Court upholding the power
of schoolteachers to compel students to recite the Pledge when it
was conducted as part of a pedagogical exercise seeking to instill
patriotism in children.
VII. THE PLEDGE AS A CIVIcs LESSON
The Supreme Court's First and Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence hardly suggests that the current Court is likely to over-
turn Barnette. One hopes that the current Court will be troubled
to know that the civics lesson typically learned by schoolchildren
is that they are supposed to pledge allegiance. One also hopes the
Court will object when school officials deliberately design their
practices so that students are never informed that Barnette is
still the controlling law of the land. Justice Brennan has stressed
that "[public education serves vital national interests in prepar-
ing the Nation's youth for life in our increasingly complex society
and for the duties of citizenship in our democratic Republic," be-
cause "[tihe public school conveys . . .the 'fundamental values'
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."131
At the heart of Newdow lies two crucial questions. The first
concerns the capacity of young children to comprehend and ab-
sorb information. The second is what we should be teaching our
children in order to maximize the likelihood that our next gen-
eration will embrace the first principles of American values. The
Newdow Panel erred, in my opinion, because it considered chil-
dren to be as sophisticated as federal appeals judges. By doing
so, the Panel placed more significance on the words "under God"
than schoolchildren are likely to. They compounded this error by
failing to use the school setting as a place to talk about the limits
on the government in shaping the ideas of the next generation.
Consequently, the Newdow Panel was unable to perceive any
role for public school teachers in teaching the First Amendment.
This extremely confining vision of education led the Panel to in-
sist that the only proper remedy is to ban the Pledge altogether.
131 Kuhlmeier, 484 US at 278, quoting Ambach v Norwick, 441 US 68, 77 (1979)
(Brennan dissenting).
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Schoolteachers should be required to use the Pledge cere-
mony as an opportunity to provide students with a civics lesson.
We should be instructing students in the first principles of
American civics during the performance of patriotic exercises.
Why do we permit American students, including those who end
up in The University of Chicago Law School, to learn for the first
time when they are adults that they had the right not to partici-
pate in ceremonies--ceremonies to which they were exposed
thousands of times in their childhood?
It may be that when a city erects a religious symbol at holi-
day time citizens are confused about whether the symbol repre-
sents an endorsement of religion. The problem in that situation
is that there is no one in a position of authority with whom to
discuss the matter and allay the citizen's concern. But in a class-
room, of all places, we should expect that these ambiguities can
be resolved.
The Supreme Court stresses that "[p] ublic education. . . 'ful-
fills a most fundamental obligation of government to its constitu-
ency.' The importance of public schools in the preparation of in-
dividuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of
the values on which our society rests, long has been recognized
by our decisions." 132 Schools, we are reminded, prepare individu-
als for participation as citizens and are a social institution
"transmitting 'the values on which our society rests."1 33
In upholding a New York statute that prohibited the certifi-
cation of a public schoolteacher who had not manifested an in-
tent to apply for United States citizenship, the Supreme Court in
Ambach v Norwich 34 cited approvingly the New York education
statute which explained that public schools are expected "to
promote a spirit of patriotic and civic service and obligation and
to foster in the children of the state moral and intellectual quali-
ties which are essential in preparing to meet the obligations of
citizenship in peace or in war." 35 Barnette's values are as impor-
tant in meeting the obligations of citizenship (at least in peace)
as any in the constellation of American rights.
"Public schools," writes Stanley Ingber, "are an indoctrina-
tor's dream." 36 Educators should adopt a robust appreciation of
132 Ambach, 441 US at 76 (citations omitted).
133 Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 221 (1982), citingAmbach, 441 US at 76.
134 441 US 68 (1979).
135 Id at 78 n 8 (citation omitted).
136 Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy". Value
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the meaning of "preparing children for citizenship and transmit-
ting basic cultural values." 137 We should do a better job of ensur-
ing that the next generation of Americans learn the values for
which Barnette stands. To accomplish this, we should cultivate
an appreciation for the flag by teaching students the constitu-
tional principles involved when we permit the flag salute.
Rather than banning the Pledge in public schools, we should
insist that students be told on a regular, ongoing basis that they
have the right not to participate, and that if they exercise that
right, no adult figure will think less of them. 138 Some teachers
might go even further and explain to students that it is not in
their interest to simply do what others choose to do, and that
they should strive to become independent thinkers who make
important decisions on the basis of what they think they ought to
do.
A civics lesson centered on the Pledge could also teach stu-
dents that American principles of liberty are based on the notion
that state officials, including public schoolteachers, may not
make students believe certain ideas and may not force them to
express their allegiance to the United States. The teachers could
explain that we have this rule because of two related concepts.
First, we don't trust state officials to control the minds of Ameri-
cans. Our democratic values, our students should be informed,
are based on the notion that the citizens run the government, not
the other way around. The teachers should tell their students
that if we permitted schoolteachers to tell students what is true
about the world of politics, students may grow up believing only
what state officials want them to believe. 139
Second, teachers should further explain why allowing state
officials to compel students to believe certain ideas would be
dangerous. Students should learn that the second reason we in-
sist that they are free to decide what to believe is that the rest of
us have more to gain from hearing as wide a range of ideas as
Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U III L Rev 15, 21.
137 William B. Senshauer, Note, Education and the Court: The Supreme Court's Edu-
cational Ideology, 40 Vand L Rev 939, 952 (1987).
138 See Stephen E. Gottlieb, In the Name of Patriotism: The Constitutionality of"Bend-
ing" History in Public Secondary Schools, 62 NYU L Rev 497 (1987) (providing a thought-
ful proposal calling upon teachers to provide balance in the classroom).
139 Barnette, 319 US at 637 ("That they are educating the young for citizenship is
reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are
not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important princi-
ples of our government as mere platitudes.").
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possible. That lesson will also prepare them to reject ideas that
they regard as foolish or wrong.140
This proposal for placing the Pledge at the center of a civics
lesson would go a long way towards implementing the true
meaning of Barnette, but it would not quite satisfy the Newdow
majority. To do this, teachers also should make clear to their
students, by means tailored to their developmental stage,'4 ' that
by including the words "under God" in the Pledge, the govern-
ment is not endorsing any particular religion, nor even acknowl-
edging the existence of God. American freedom, students should
learn, includes the freedom of individual conscience.
Teachers should want students to understand that the
Founding Fathers consciously created a country that forbids the
government from endorsing religion or taking a religious posi-
tion. Students should be told that because many Americans are
deeply religious, our government also must allow each person the
free exercise of his own religion. At the same time, because many
Americans are deeply religious, we try to compromise as best we
can and to recognize that God plays a significant role in many
people's lives. For this reason, the reference to God in the Pledge
"may merely recognize the historical fact that our Nation was
believed to have been founded 'under God.""42
The most important thing teachers should tell students is
that no one should feel uncomfortable as the Pledge is recited.
Students should be told explicitly that regardless of their deci-
sion on whether to recite the Pledge, they are exercising one of
the greatest freedoms of all: the right to make their own decision
about the life they wish to lead. For this reason, they should be
told to not participate if they are uncomfortable participating, or
simply would prefer not to.
CONCLUSION
Educating our children is among our most important social
functions. The principles we teach our children will shape the
140 Teaching students these core values of free speech prepares them for obligations of
citizenship, assists in the refinement of their ability to pursue truth and helps them
achieve self-fulfillment. Consider John H. Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57
Tex L Rev 321, 333-49 (1979).
141 For example, while the youngest students may not be capable of participating in a
theoretical discussion of these principles, their teachers could design appropriate exer-
cises and activities for instilling the underlying values.
142 Abington School District v Schempp, 374 US 203, 304 (1963) (Brennan concurring).
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future of America. The question remains as to the best means of
raising a generation of Americans to respect independence of
mind and the right to disagree within a broader, common society
of good will.
Certainly, blind adherence to peer pressure fails to accom-
plish that. On the other hand, is it necessary to create a forced
environment for young people-much as is done in religious
training-in order to bring young people along to the point when
individual thought may take over? If the ideas expressed in this
Article disturb some, it is likely because they believe that we
cannot allow too much freedom in the minds of young people be-
fore we have inculcated them into the spirit of belonging to
American society.
Regrettably, courts tend to pay virtually no attention to im-
portant empirical statements about education, learning theory,
and acculturation theory. The Newdow Panel's decision rests on
an understanding of children, their capacity to think, and how
they learn. That opinion strikes me as misguided in its under-
standing of children. But the specter it raises of inappropriate
coercion of children by public school officials is important and
deserves more careful attention by our courts.
A careful student of the American educational system might
reasonably conclude that ours is a country committed to avoiding
teaching children about the dangers of government control. That
is a lesson reserved for adults-after they've been subjected to
years of value inculcation in "patriotism." Though Barnette is a
powerful statement about the limits of state officials to control
the minds of its citizens, it has not been implemented as a
statement that our children need to learn these things while they
are children. Nor is it interpreted as a vision that our public
schools must teach children of their right to disagree even with
fundamental patriotic claims. Barnette eloquently stands for the
proposition that because schools "are educating the young for
citizenship [there] is reason for scrupulous protection of Consti-
tutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the
free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes."1 43 The ultimate
irony is that public school officials have been able to reduce
Barnette to a mere platitude.
143 Barnette, 319 US at 637.
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We should demand more of school officials. The Newdow
Panel evinced an understandable, but ultimately unacceptable,
lack of faith in a public school's ability to do better. Banning the
Pledge from the public school avoids the need for public schools
to teach American children the limits of governmental authority
to inculcate children with religious and political ideas. Instead,
we should take every possible opportunity to teach this lesson.
